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COMMENT
HOLD SEPARATE ORDERS IN
HORIZONTAL ACQUISITIONS-JUDICIAL
REFUGE BEHIND A REMEDIAL FACADE:
FTC v. WEYERHAEUSER CO.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act 1 protects the public from a noncompetitive marketplace by proscribing mergers that may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.2 To foster
I Clayton

Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Section 7 provides in perti-

nent part:
No person engaged in commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall
acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital and no person subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission
shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another person engaged also in
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce, where in any line of commerce or
in any activity affecting commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a
monopoly.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (Supp. IV 1980).
2 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 565-69 (1972); United States
v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 552 (1966). Section 7 provides a statutory vehicle for
directly attacking mergers that significantly may decrease competition or tend to create a
monopoly. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (Supp. IV 1980); S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5
(1950); H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949). To alleviate the uncertainty regarding the scope of the Clayton Act's proscriptions, see id.; Note, Section 7 of the Clayton
Act: A Legislative History, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 766, 768-69 (1952), Congress enacted the
Cellar-Kefauver Amendment, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 18, 21 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)). This provision expanded the reach of section 7 to
cover the acquisition of corporate assets, Note, supra, at 770; see Bok, Section 7 of the
Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARv. L. REV. 226, 234-35 (1960),
and made it quite clear that the proscriptions of the Clayton Act were intended to apply to
horizontal, vertical and conglomerate acquisitions, see FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386
U.S. 568, 577 (1967).
Unlike the Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1-7 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)), which is designed to abrogate extant anticompetitive practices, the Clayton Act is preventive in nature. See, e.g., United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S.
100, 107 (1948). Hence, the Clayton Act is intended to eliminate "monopolistic tendencies in
their incipiency, before they attain Sherman Act proportions." In re Scott Paper Co., 57
F.T.C. 1415, 1441 (1960); accord Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 800, 822 (9th Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 937 (1962). See generally L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
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this goal, Congress enacted section 13(b) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act,' which provides that a court may enjoin a proposed merger "[u]pon a proper showing that, weighing the equities
and considering the Commission's likelihood of ultimate success,
such action would be in the public interest."'4 Numerous issues
have arisen regarding the operation of this section. For example, it
has been unclear whether the statutory command to balance the
equities applies only to public considerations, or whether it reaches
private equities as well.' In addition, although the issuance of a
OF ANTITRUST 602-03 (1977). A court considering the legality of a transaction, therefore,

focuses upon whether the contemplated acquisition may substantially lessen competition.
See Crown Zellerbach Corp., 296 F.2d at 822.
3 Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 408(f), 87
Stat. 576 (presently codified at 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1976)). Section 13(b) provides in pertinent
part:
Whenever the Commission has reason to believe(1) that any person, partnership, or corporation is violating, or is about to
violate, any provision of law enforced by the Federal Trade Commission ... the
Commission by any of its attorneys designated by it for such purpose may bring
suit in a district court of the United States to enjoin any such act or practice.
Upon a proper showing that, weighing the equities and considering the Commission's likelihood of ultimate success, such action would be in the public interest,
and after notice to the defendant, a temporary restraining order or a preliminary
injunction may be granted ....
15 U.S.C. § 536 (1976).
' Id. Section 13(b) was enacted to provide the FTC with a viable method of enforcing
section 7 of the Clayton Act. See Halverson, The Federal Trade Commission's Injunctive
Powers Under the Alaska Pipeline Amendments: An Analysis, 69 Nw. U.L. Ray. 872, 872
n.1 (1975). This legislation was considered necessary because the competitive policies embodied in section 7 frequently had been frustrated by the FTC's inability to prevent mergers
or to accomplish effective divestiture. See Hearings on S. 15 Before the Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,84th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1956); Elzinga, The
Antimerger Law: Pyrrhic Victories?, 12 J.L. & ECON. 43, 53 (1969); see also NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REvmw OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PRocEDURES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDEM
AND ATrORNEY GENERAL (1979), reprinted in 80 F.R.D. 509, 609-12 (1979). Compare FTC v.
National Tea Co., 603 F.2d 694, 697 (8th Cir. 1979) (in deciding whether to grant a preliminary injunction, the court may consider acquiring-firm's promise to divest itself within 6
months in the event the merger is held in violation of section 7) with FTC v. Lancaster
Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088, 1096-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (injunctions are more effective
than divestiture in enforcing section 7).
9 Many courts regard the threat to the economy as well as the public interest in enforcement of the antitrust laws as the only considerations in determining whether to issue a
section 13(b) injunction. E.g., FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088, 1096
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). In FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc., 539 F.2d 1339 (4th Cir. 1976), for example, the court held that an injunction should be issued automatically upon a showing of a
prima facie case. Id. at 1344-46. Many courts, however, will take private factors into consideration, United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061, 1073 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(private equities may be considered, but should not outweigh public considerations), aff'd
mem. sub nom. Bartlett v. United States, 401 U.S. 986 (1971); FTC v. National Tea Co., 603
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temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction clearly is
permitted under the statute,6 neither the language nor the legislative history of section 13(b) indicates whether courts may award
other types of equitable relief designed to protect the public's interest in a competitive market.' Recently, in FTC v. Weyerhaeuser
Co., 8 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit resolved these issues, holding that it is not erroneous for a court to
consider private as well as public equities that support interim relief less drastic than a preliminary injunction,9 and that it is proper
to issue a hold separate order10 in lieu of injunctive relief under
section 13(b). 1 '
In Weyerhauser, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) sought
to prevent a proposed horizontal merger between Weybuy Incorporated1 2 and Menasha Corporation, two west coast producers of
"corrugating medium."' 3 Because each entity had made significant
competitive contributions in the relevant geographic and product
markets, 14 the FTC expressed concern that the elimination of
F.2d 694, 697 (1979) (district court properly considered harm to the merging entities, but
public interest is to be given the greater weight), notwithstanding that an injunction may be
granted upon a showing of probable success on the merits regardless of harm to the parties,
United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 568 (N.D. IM. 1968).
6 See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1976).
7 See id.; H.R. REP. No. 624, 93d Cong., 1st SESS. 31, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2523, 2533.
8 665 F.2d 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
9 Id. at 1083-84.
10 A hold separate order permits the consummation of a merger, but mandates that the
assets of the merging entities remain segregated until the legality of the transaction can be
considered in a plenary section 7 action. See, e.g., FTC v. PepsiCo., Inc., 477 F.2d 24, 30 (2d
Cir. 1973); Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. Duncan, 486 F. Supp. 1047, 1055 (N.D. Ill.
1980); United States v. United Technologies Corp., 466 F. Supp. 196, 202 (N.D.N.Y. 1979).
Although this form of relief has been used since 1956, see, e.g., United States v. Brown Shoe
Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68, 244, at 71, 116-17 (E.D. Mo. 1956), hold separate orders
remain embedded in "one of the grey areas of merger law" because of a lack of authoritative
commentary suggesting criteria and guidelines for their use, Axinn & Stoll, Weyerhaeuser
Decision:FTC Is Boxed Again, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 20, 1981, at 2, col. 4. For an article advocating
more liberal resort to hold separate orders, see Note, PreliminaryRelief for the Government Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 79 HAnv. L. REv. 391, 394-98 (1965).
11665 F.2d at 1084.
22 Weybuy was a wholly owned subsidiary of Weyerhaeuser Company, and had been
formed to facilitate the merger. Id. at 1074 n.3.
13Id. at 1074. Under the terms of the proposed merger, Weyerhaeuser was to acquire
all of Menasha's holdings on the West Coast. Id. These assets included an unimproved parcel of land, a corrugating medium mill, and a corrugated container plant. Id.
H Prior to the merger, there had been an economically significant corrugating medium
market on the West Coast, encompassing the states of Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. 1981-1 Trade
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Menasha as a competitor and the corresponding increase in market
concentration would encourage collusive pricing policies. 15 Accordingly, the FTC filed for preliminary injunctive relief pursuant to
section 13(b) of the FTC Act. 6 Although the evidence presented
by the FTC demonstrated the requisite likelihood of success on the
17
merits for issuance of the injunction pursuant to section 13(b),'
the district court denied this relief, relying upon the statute's command to weigh the equities.'" Focusing upon those equities, the
court determined that the unchallenged aspects of the merger
would create sufficient public benefits, including a potential increase in employment, to support denial of the injunction. 9 The
district court then concluded that a hold separate order was a
more appropriate remedy, reasoning that such relief would obviate
the need to enjoin the merger while accomplishing the basic goals
of section 13(b).20
On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit2 ' affirmed, holding
that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by refusing to
grant the injunction.2 2 The court rejected the FTC's contention
that an injunction should issue automatically upon a satisfaction of
the statutory burden,23 explaining that Congress intended the
Cas. (CCH) 1 63,974, at 76,043-44 (D.D.C. 1981). Within this relevant geographic market,
Menasha had been considered the third largest, and Weyerhaeuser the seventh, among producers of corrugating medium-the fluted, cardboard-like material which forms the center
layer of the cardboard sheets from which corrugated containers are made. 665 F.2d at 1074
& n.2.
1 665 F.2d at 1074-75. The FTC was concerned only with the anticompetitive effects of
the merger upon the corrugating medium market. Id. at 1074. Hence, the Commission objected to the acquisition of the corrugating medium mill, but did not contest the transfer of
the unimproved land or the corrugated container plant. Id.
Is Id.
17 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 63,974, at 76,041-47. The district court conceded that the
FTC had satisfied its burden of demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits pursuant to section 13(b). Id. at 76,047.
11 665 F.2d at 1080-81; see 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1976); supra note 3.
19665 F.2d at 1082. The district court observed that Weyerhaeuser planned to build a
linerboard mill on the land acquired from Menasha. Id. at 1075. Because construction of
this mill would increase the supply of linerboard in the market and would relieve unemployment in the area, the court found that "public equities" militated against issuance of the
injunction. Id. Looking to private equities, the court reached a similar conclusion, noting
that the shareholders of Menasha, a closely held corporation, would obtain a liquid asset by
exchanging their stock for Weyerhaeuser shares. Id.
20 Id. at 1075; see 1981-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) T 63,974, at 76,049.
2 The circuit panel consisted of Judges Ginsburg, MacKinnon, and Mikva.
22 665 F.2d at 1090.
23 Id. at 1081; see, e.g., United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061, 1073
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd mem. sub nom. Bartlett v. United States, 401 U.S. 986 (1971); United
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courts to weigh both public and private equities and to evaluate
the likelihood of competitive harm when deciding whether an injunction under section 13(b) is appropriate. 24 Noting that both
types of equities have been considered in cases decided before the
enactment of the statute, the court reasoned that "[s]ince Congress
intended to codify that case law, we have no warrant to drop private equities from the calculus." 25 The court emphasized, however,
that private equities, standing alone, are not sufficient to outweigh
the FTC's showing of a "likelihood of ultimate success. '2 6 Observing that the public equities considered by the district court in
Weyerhaeuser "would not qualify as defenses" in a plenary action
for an injunction under section 7 of the Clayton Act,27 the court
nevertheless determined that these factors could be considered in a
section 13(b) proceeding.25 The court reasoned that because "[t]he
determination of a likelihood of success must be made under time
pressure and on incomplete evidence," the potential for erroneous
decisions justified the examination of factors not ordinarily considered in section 7 actions.29
Examining the trial court's decision to award relief less drastic
than an injunction, the court noted that it was "logical to assume"
that section 13(b) was intended by Congress to permit the courts
to "mold decrees 'to the necessities of the particular case.' ,o In
this regard, the court observed that a hold separate order would
afford sufficient protection to the public interest in some circumstances.3 1 Attempting to identify these situations, the court enunciated a three-pronged test which must be satisfied before the order
properly may be issued.3 2 First, "significant equities" must favor
consummation of the transaction; second, the hold separate order
must safeguard the availability of final relief if the merger ultiStates v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 568 (N.D. Ill.
1968). Contra FTC v.
Food Town Stores, Inc., 539 F.2d 1339, 1345-46 (4th Cir. 1976); FTC v. Lancaster Colony
Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088, 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).

2'665 F.2d at 1083.
26 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.

30 Id. at 1084.
21 Id.
at 1087.
32Id. at 1085. The court explained that its novel three-pronged standard would neither
"countenance" equity nor supercede the independent judgment of the court by permitting
the FTC to promulgate a per se rule. Id.

1982]

HOLD SEPARATE ORDERS

mately does not withstand scrutiny; and finally, the order must be
expected to restrain interim competitive harm.33 Applying these
guidelines to the facts involved in Weyerhaeuser, the majority concluded that the hold separate order issued by the trial court was
indeed appropriate.3 4

Judge Mikva dissented, asserting that the court should not
have granted a form of relief which the legislature failed to include
as a statutory remedy.36 Noting that the policy arguments ad-.
vanced by the majority36 were unpersuasive, Judge Mikva stated
that the court had "turn[ed] a blind eye to the costs to the public
of permitting this merger to be consummated. 3s7 Finally, Judge
Mikva expressed concern that the decision would be interpreted as
a signal that the District of Columbia Circuit would resolve future
"hard cases" by resorting to the "easy" remedy of hold separate
orders.38
Through reliance upon the admonition contained in section
13(b) that the judiciary must "weigh the equities" before issuing a
preliminary injunction, the Weyerhaeuser court has permitted the
consummation of an allegedly anticompetitive transaction. It is
33 Id. at 1087.
1, Id. at 1088-90. The court stated that its decision to issue a hold separate order
should not be construed as a "compromise [of] the public interest in antitrust enforcement."
Id. at 1090. Instead, the court cautioned, "[e]ach case must be approached on its unique
facts and with appropriate attention to the purpose of Section 13(b)." Id. (footnote
omitted).
11 Id. at 1091 (Mikva, J., dissenting). The dissent argued that this is the first case to
hold that a court may issue a hold separate order pursuant to section 13(b), notwithstanding
that the remedy is not explicitly authorized by the section. Id. (Mikva, J., dissenting); see 15
U.S.C. § 53(b) (1976). Moreover, Judge Mikva posited that a hold separate order is permissible only in those circumstances when the FTC has not satisfied the terms of section 13(b).
665 F.2d at 1091 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
31 Id. at 1087. The majority noted that a hold separate order seeks to preserve a transaction that ultimately may be upheld under section 7. Id. Additionally, the court stated that
"a hold separate order shifts the risk of decline in value of the challenged assets" to the
acquiring entity. Id. Finally, the majority observed that since this transaction contained
unchallenged benefits, a hold separate order would enable the public to enjoy these benefits
without FTC interference. Id.
1 Id. at 1092 (Mikva, J., dissenting). Judge Mikva concluded that although the hold
separate order may appear to be an effective compromise measure in close cases, the effectiveness of the order for the most part is superficial and "thrust[s] the courts into an activist
supervisory role that ill suits them." Id. at 1096 (Mikva, J., dissenting); see United States v.
Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 163 (1948).
" 665 F.2d at 1096 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
39 Corporate acquisitions frequently have been abandoned after preliminary injunctions
were issued. E.g., Lewis, PreliminaryInjunctions in Government Section 7 Litigation, 17
ANTITRUST BULL. 1, 7 & n.2 (1972); see FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc., 547 F.2d 247, 248
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submitted, however, that Congress never intended the judiciary to
look to the types of equities considered by the District of Columbia
Circuit to deny the requested injunctive relief in Weyerhaeuser.
The legislative history of section 13(b) clearly indicates that the
controversial language of the statute was intended merely to codify
existing case law which has required courts to exercise independent
judgment in the issuance of temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions. 40 Hence, it is apparent that neither section
13(b) itself nor its legislative history suggests that the judiciary
should examine private equities before determining the propriety
of the requested relief.4 1 Moreover, injection of private considerations into the 13(b) analysis is inconsistent with recent lower court
decisions which have held that such interests are entitled to little,
if any, weight in 13(b) proceedings.42
Perhaps more disturbing than the District of Columbia Circuit's approach to the equities involved in Weyerhaeuser was its
substitution of a hold separate order for the statutorily sanctioned
preliminary injunction. 43 Although section 13(b) expressly provides
(4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 570 (N.D. DI.
1968); Kelley, PreliminaryInjunctions in FTC Merger Cases: A Proposal for Expanded
Use of PreliminaryStructuralDecrees, 14 U.S.F.L. REv. 1, 37-41 (1979); Note, supra note
10, at 392-94.
10 H.R. REP. No. 624, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 31, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2523, 2533; see FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 677 (2d Cir. 1963); FTC v.
National Health Aids, 108 F. Supp. 340, 346 (D. Md. 1952). Congress, fearing that the judiciary automatically would issue injunctions upon mere request, included in section 13(b) a
clause requiring the courts to use independent judgment before granting the petitioned-for
relief. H.R. REP. No. 624, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 31, reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS

2523, 2533.

41 See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1976); H.R. REP. No. 624, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 31, reprinted in
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2523, 2533; supra note 40.
42 See, e.g., FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc., 539 F.2d 1339, 1345-46 (4th Cir. 1976);

1973 U.S.

FTC v. Rhinechem Corp., 459 F. Supp. 785, 791 (N.D. IlM. 1978); FTC v. Lancaster Colony
Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088, 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). But see United States v. Atlantic Richfield
Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061, 1073 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd mem. sub nom. Bartlett v. United States,
401 U.S. 986 (1971); United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68,244, at
71,116 (E.D. Mo. 1956). Interestingly, the Weyerhaeuser court itself noted that no weight
ought to be accorded to "a mere expectation of private gain from a transaction the FTC has
shown is likely to violate the antitrust laws." 665 F.2d at 1083 n.26. In addition, the court
appeared to suggest that private equities should not be considered in cases where the "entire transaction [is] vulnerable to legal challenge." Id.
43 Had a hold separate order been provided for in section 13(b), it is suggested that
such a remedy would have presented an attractive, albeit undesirable, alternative to the
issuance of a preliminary injunction in a horizontal merger context. In this regard, it should
be recognized that the effect of a hold separate order is to suspend the actual mingling of
corporate assets, rather than to preclude the consummation of a potentially lawful merger.
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for the issuance of temporary restraining orders and preliminary
injunctions,4 4 it makes no reference to hold separate orders. The
fashioning of this new remedy, not specifically contemplated by
the FTC Act, raises serious questions as to whether the province of
the legislature has been invaded. 45 Hence, a well-known canon of
statutory construction warns that a court should not correct legislative omissions through interpretation, since the legislature may
have decided affirmatively not to include that particular avenue of
relief. 46 When Congress enacted section 13(b), it apparently was
well aware that hold separate orders frequently had been used by
the FTC. Nevertheless, the legislature chose not to include such
48
orders within the remedial scheme of the statute.
Moreover, it is submitted that the remedial approach adopted
See FTC v. Exxon Corp., 636 F.2d 1336, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Note, supra note 10, at 39198 (1965); see also Kelley, supra note 39, at 37-42. Indeed, several courts have issued hold
separate orders where the party seeking the preliminary injunction did not establish a
probability of success on the merits or a risk of anticompetitive harm pending the section 7
action. See, e.g., FTC v. Southland Corp., 471 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D.D.C. 1979); United States v.
Culbro Corp., 436 F. Supp. 746, 754-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); United States v. Brown .Shoe Co.,
1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,244 at 71,116-17 (E.D. Mo. 1956). Hold separate orders also
have been issued where the court has made a determination that the competitive strength of
the acquired entity would improve under the terms of the order. See United States v. Heileman Brewing Co., 345 F. Supp. 117, 124 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (hold separate order was appropriate since acquired entity would have gone out of existence by the time of final determination on the merits). See generally Note, supra note 10, at 400-01. Additionally, the issuance
of a hold separate order has been deemed proper where both parties consented to such
issuance. See FTC v. Pillsbury Co., 88 F.T.C. 769, 769-73 (N.D. Ill. 1976).
4 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1976).
"ISee generally 1 A.J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 1.02, at
4 (C. Sands 4th rev. ed. 1972). Apparently admonishing fellow members of the bench, Justice Traynor stated that one of the limits on judicial creativity was preserving "the distance
between judicial analysis and legislative innovation." Traynor, The Limits of JudicialCreativity, 63 IowA L. REV. 1, 2 (1977).
" See 1 A.J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 45, § 1.02, at 4. A basic tenet of statutory construction states that when a statute requires that an act be done in a specific form or manner, it excludes every other form or manner of performance. See Smith v. Stevens, 77 U.S.
(10 Wall.) 321, 326-27 (1870); see also F. FRANKFURTER, SoME REFLECTIONS ON THE READINGS
OF STATUTES 20 (1947) ("legislation has an aim; it seeks to ... supply an inadequacy ....

That aim, that policy is not drawn, like nitrogen, out of the air, it is evinced in the language
of the statute").

"I Cf. supra note 43 (indicating circumstances where FTC has issued hold separate orders). Prior to the enactment of section 13(b), the Commission possessed no direct statutory
authority to enjoin an anticompetitive merger. See Halverson, supra note 4, at 873-74. This
congressional inaction prompted the Commission to seek other methods of obtaining preliminary relief. Id. at 876-77. For instance, in 1966 the Supreme Court allowed the FTC, pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976), to petition the circuit courts for preliminary relief in section 7 cases. FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 603-05 (1966).
'8 See 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (1976).
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by the Weyerhaeuser majority does not comport with the legislative purpose of the statute. The enactment of section 13(b) was
motivated in part by a congressional awareness that anticompetitive mergers endanger legitimate economic and societal objectives.49 Congress selected the preliminary injunction as the vehicle
to forestall the consummation of such mergers because this remedy
not only maintains the preventative focus of the Clayton Act,50 but
also provides the courts with a viable method of preserving a
meaningful status quo pending review of a merger's competitive
impact.5 1 The Weyerhaeuser court's conclusion that hold separate
orders will achieve that status quo pendente lite appears misplaced, particularly in the context of horizontal mergers.52
'9 Section 7 of the Clayton Act was intended to halt anticompetitive practices in their
incipiency. See United States v. M.P.M., Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 90 (D. Colo. 1975); supra
note 3 and accompanying text. More specifically, the objective of section 7 is to quash mergers that may harm competition by eliminating competitors or by increasing concentration
within the market. See United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350,
366 (1970). "Congress saw the process of concentration in American business as a dynamic
force; it sought to assure the Federal Trade Commission and the courts the power to brake
this force at its outset and before it gathered momentum." Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 317-18 (1962); see S. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1950).
See generally Note, supra note 2, at 767-68 (1952).
"0 See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
51 See United States v. Hospital Affiliates Int'l, Inc., 1980-1981 Trade Cas. (CCH)
63,721, at 77,853-54 (E.D. La. 1980) (preliminary injunction rather than hold separate order
is the appropriate remedy if there is a risk of anticompetitive harm); United States v.
Pennzoil Co., 252 F. Supp. 962, 988 (W.D. Pa. 1965) (congressional intent underlying section
7 and the inadequacy of divestiture favor issuance of preliminary injunction). Indeed, the
availability of injunctive relief to the FTC is essential to effective enforcement of antitrust
legislation. See FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 606 n.5 (1966) ("[w]ithout standing to
secure injunctive relief and thereby safeguard its ability to order an effective divestiture of
acquired properties, the Commission's efforts would be frustrated"); United States v. Wilson
Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 569 (N.D. IlM. 1968).
512See, e.g., FTC v. Rhinechem Corp., 459 F. Supp. 785, 790-91 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (issuance of hold separate order places judiciary in an inappropriate activist supervisory role);
FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088, 1096-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (hold separate
order is unsatisfactory because allowing acquistion to go forward eliminates actual and potential competition between merging entities); Pargas, Inc. v. Empire Gas Corp., 423 F.
Supp. 199, 247 n.21 (D. Md.) (hold separate orders in situations where merger is probably
illegal run contrary to public policy as embodied in section 7 of Clayton Act), aff'd, 546 F.2d
25 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061, 1073-74
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) (public interest, legislative intent in section 7, and difficulties of divestiture
all require preliminary injunction rather than hold separate order in horizontal acquisition),
aff'd mem. sub nom. Bartlett v. United States, 401 U.S. 986 (1971); United States v. Wilson
Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 569 (N.D. IM. 1968) (consummation of merger under
hold separate order would not obviate interim competitive harm). See generally L. SULUVAN, supra note 2, at 669-71; Elzinga, supra note 4, at 53; Pfunder, Plaine & Whittemore,
Compliance with Divestiture Orders Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act: An Analysis of
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The hold separate order appears to be a markedly unsuited
means of checking interim competitive harm in horizontal mergers5 3 because the entities involved are direct competitors prior to
consummation of the transaction." It has been recognized that it is
somewhat unrealistic to expect a held separate company to maintain vigorous competition with its acquiring parent.5 5 Clearly, the
hold separate order creates inherent conflicts of interest and practical disincentives for competition between the acquired and acquiring entities pendente lite. Moreover, since the records, trade
secrets, and confidential market information of the held separate
entity will be vulnerable to transfer to personnel of the acquiring
parent, a return to premerger market conditions may be impossible
if the transaction ultimately fails to survive scrutiny.5 6 In view of
the Relief Obtained, 17 ANTITRUST BULL. 19, 76-77 n.84 (1972).
11A horizontal merger is an acquistion prior to which the acquiring firm and the firm to
be acquired compete directly with each other in the same relevant geographical and product
markets. See Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976) (statute refers to relevant geographic
and product markets by use of terminology such as "section of the country" and "line of
commerce"); L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, at 600. Indeed, the Supreme Court has defined a
horizontal merger as "[a]n economic arrangement between companies performing similar
functions in the production or sale of comparable goods or services." Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294, 334 (1962). See generally Meehan, Rules v. Discretion: A Reevaluation of the Merger Guidelines for HorizontalMergers, 23 ANTITRUST BULL. 769, 772
(1978); Note, Horizontal Mergers After United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 92 HARv.
L. REv. 491, 499-502 (1978).
See generally R. PosNFR, ANTITRUST 381-510 (1974). As previously noted, see supra
note 53, horizontal mergers are mergers between companies that sell one or more competing
products in the same geographic market. E. KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 90 (2d ed.
1973); e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 272 (1966) (third largest retail
grocery chain in the Los Angeles area acquired sixth largest retailer). Thus, in the horizontal
merger context, it is apparent that, after the issuance of a hold separate order, the company
being acquired may not be able to maintain vigorous competition with its acquiring parent.
See United States v. Pennzoil Co., 252 F. Supp. 962, 987-88 (W.D. Pa. 1965). In Pennzoil,
the court specifically addressed the problems which arise after a merger has been consummated. Id. The court, rejecting the acquired company's argument that it could continue to
function as a separate entity after consummation, stated that
[t]he defendants' contention is... for present purposes meaningless. Pennzoil will
be the sole stockholder of [the defendant's] Board of Directors and determine its
policies. For the defendants to urge that [the acquired corporation] would remain
an active competitor of Pennzoil is to totally disregard the realities of the market
place.
Id. at 987.
18L. SULLIVAN supra note 2, at 671; see Note, supra note 10, at 395-96 (even if entities
are held separate pendente lite, their executives will find it difficult to forget that success on
the merits is tantamount to union).
5 Hold separate orders create the risk that confidential information and trade secrets
will be transferred from the held separate entity to the acquiring company. See, e.g., F. &
M. Schaefer Corp. v. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 597 F.2d 814, 818 (2d Cir. 1979) (access to
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the clearly expressed congressional policies favoring the growth of
competition and advocating the issuance of injunctions to preserve
the status quo, 57 it is suggested that the Weyerhaeuser court's insertion of hold separate orders into the remedial scheme of section
13(b) does not further the goals of the statute."
Although the hold separate order does not fall within the
scope of remedies offered by section 13(b), it is submitted that
there are cases in which a court may rely upon its inherent equity
powers to issue such relief.59 When the challenged transaction is a
vertical merger, 0 for example, the prospects of competitive harm
confidential trade information). Even if a hold separate order contains strict proscriptions
against the transfer of such confidential information, the relationship between the parties to
the transaction nevertheless presents ample opportunity for inadvertent transfers. See Elco
Corp. v. Microdot, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 741, 754 (D. Del. 1973); see also United States v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530, 543 (W.D. Pa.), af'd, 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963); L.
SULLIVAN, supra, note 2 at 670-71; Note, supra note 10, at 395-96.
7 See Elco Corp. v. Microdot, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 741, 754 (D. Del. 1973) ("the potential
for future control, as a practical matter, is bound to influence Elco's market place decisions
to some degree in the interim").
" See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text. In addition to the intercorporate
problems created by the issuance of hold separate orders, see supra text accompanying
notes 53-55, the courts and the FTC are burdened with the onerous task of ensuring compliance with the terms of such orders, see, e.g., FTC v. Exxon Corp., 636 F.2d 1336, 1344-47
(D.C. Cir. 1980); FTC v. Rhinechem Corp., 459 F. Supp. 785, 790-91 (N.D. IIl. 1978); see
also FTC v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088, 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
' After a violation of section 7 has been established, courts typically attempt to provide remedies which will restore premerger competition to the marketplace. See 1 M. HANDLER, TWENTY FIvE YEARS OF ANTITRUST 146-49 (1973). To this end, a divestiture order mandates that the acquiring entity dispose of the acquired assets following the successful
prosecution of the unlawful merger. E.g., United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 179 F. Supp.
721, 741 (E.D. Mo. 1959); 15 J. VON KALINOWSlu, ANTrrRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION
LAWS § 114.0311]; see, e.g., Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC, 577 F.2d 1368, 1379-80 (9th Cir.
1978); OKC Corp. v. FTC, 455 F.2d 1159, 1162-63 (10th Cir. 1972). Even where the assets
have remained segregated pursuant to a hold separate order, the complexities of divestiture
are often overwhelming. See NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REvIEw OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND
PROCEDURES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (1979), reprinted in 80
F.R.D. 509, 609-11 (1979). In its report, the Commission noted that divestiture is burdensome not only because the assets become "scrambled," but also because the nature of the
assets themselves may have changed. 80 F.R.D. at 609. Notably, several lower federal courts
have recognized that hold separate orders do not aid in rectifying the problems inherent in
divestiture. See, e.g., FTC v. Rhinechem Corp., 459 F. Supp. 785, 790 (N.D. Ill. 1978); FTC
v. Lancaster Colony Corp., 434 F. Supp. 1088, 1096 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
60 A vertical merger is a merger by which one company acquires all or part of the stock
or assets of a company which, itself, is a customer or supplier of the company to be acquired. See 3 J. voN KALINOWSKI, supra note 59, § 17.0311]. In contrast to a horizontal
merger, a vertical merger alone does not increase market concentration in either of the two
markets involved. Id. § 17.0313]. For a discussion of the different types of vertical mergers,
see id. § 17.0311]; Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).

1982]

HOLD SEPARATE ORDERS

may not be serious enough to support the issuance of an injunction
under section 13(b). 6 1 A court nonetheless may exercise its equitable powers to render less drastic relief, reasoning that such a
course of action is necessary to further the policies embodied in
the antitrust laws. 2 It is suggested that a hold separate order can
be useful in such instances. To be sure, after a vertical merger is
consummated, the participating entities operate through a reciprocal relationship in which each must rely upon the other to attain
economic success.6 3 Although this type of merger presents the danger of "market foreclosure"-in which the acquired entity's competitors are harmed by the exclusive dealing between the merged
companies- e4 there is little risk that either entity will disappear
from the competitive scene before a court can adjudicate the merits in a plenary action. 5 Indeed, because the parties are not direct
competitors, the combined entity will not benefit from the elimination of the acquired entity, and hence, the risk of interim competitive harm is more limited than that occasioned by a horizontal
merger.6 6
Hold separate orders are also well suited to the conglomerate
merger situation. 7 Conglomerate mergers, generally, do not have
an immediate effect on existing competition. The primary evil
61See 3 J. von Kalinowski, supra note 59, § 17.0313]. A vertical merger does not lessen
competition immediately because it does not necessarily eliminate any competitors in the
relevant market. Id. For instance, where a manufacturing entity provides the supply and a
retailer furnishes the market for such supply, neither company, regardless of which is the
acquiring firm, has any incentive to create interim competitive harm. Id.
62

Cf. United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066, 1097-1100 (N.D. Ill.

1969) (hold separate order is more effective in a vertical merger context). See generally
Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1313,
1321-22 (1965).
11 See 3 J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 59, § 17.0313].
4 See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox 231 (1978).
65 See id.
68 See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36, 63-67 (S.D.N.Y.

1966); Smith-Victor Corp. v. Sylvania Elec. Prod., Inc., 242 F. Supp. 315, 317-20 (N.D. Ill.
1965); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 168 F. Supp. 576, 611-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
See generally E. KINTNER, PRIMER ON THE LAW OF MERGERS 214-16 (1973).
67 Conglomerate mergers have been defined as any "mergers that are neither

horizontal

nor vertical." Vanderstar, Conglomerate Mergers: The Developing Antitrust Guidelines, 44
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 596, 596 (spec. ed. 1970); see Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 435 F. Supp. 1249, 1284 (N.D. Ohio 1977). This type of merger accounts for the
majority of large mergers. Note, The Business Protection Act and the Control of Conglom-

erate Mergers, 58 TEx. L. REV. 588, 598 & n.38 (1980).
I' Unlike horizontal mergers, which immediately reduce the number of competitors in a

given market, see supra note 53, the impact of a conglomerate merger is not immediately
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such mergers promote is eventual change in overall market structure and, thus, the anticompetitive effect is prospective.6 9 Since a
hold separate order is only a preliminary remedy, 7 0 most cases indiscernible, Note, supra note 67, at 601. Consequently, three basic theories have been expounded to assess market impact: potential competition, entrenchment, and reciprocity.
The potential competition theory is predicated upon the possibility that, had there been no
merger, the acquiring firm may have entered the market as a competitor of the acquired
firm. See Note, supra note 67, at 602. A corollary to this doctrine is the "perceived" potential competition theory which states that the threat of an outside competitor entering the
market stimulates competition within the market. See id. Entrenchment, on the other hand,
involves a merger in which the dominant market position of a firm would be so strengthened
or entrenched by the merger that new firms would be impeded from entering the market
and smaller firms would be reluctant to compete aggressively. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble, 386 U.S. at 578; Vanderstar, supra note 67, at 603. This inhibiting effect on competition
is based, in part, upon the threat of cross-subsidization, whereby a conglomerate uses its
resources from one market to support low, or even predatory, prices in another. See Standridge & Santopietro, Regulating the Pure Conglomerate Merger. Important Legislative
Task or Useless Exercise, 30 SYRACUSE L. REV. 607, 632 (1979). Reciprocity, the third major
theory employed to prove the anticompetitive market impact of conglomerate mergers, has
been defined as "the use of buying power to secure a competitive advantage in the sale of
one's own products." 8 J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 59, § 63.01. Indeed, a large conglomerate often serves as both supplier and customer of a smaller firm. Thus, faced with actual
or potential threats of losing the conglomerate as a customer, the smaller business may feel
compelled to continue dealing with the conglomerate as a supplier, regardless of the quality
or price. See generally Note, Reciprocity as a Basis for Challenging Conglomerate Mergers
Under the Clayton Act, 12 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 481 (1981).
"' See supra note 68. Recently, large conglomerates have assumed a more pervasive role
in our economic structure. See Note, supra note 68, at 481-82. Many view these conglomerates as inherently evil since their very size implies a degree of political and social power.
See, e.g., Standridge & Santopietro, supra note 68, at 610 & n.7; Vanderstar, supra note 67,
at 610; cf. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 810-12 (1978) (White, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing fear of corporate domination of political process). As these firms
continue to grow, so does the number of lives their activity affects, see R. BORK, supra note
64, at 50-71, 90-106, and so does the political power they eventually can wield, Note, supra
note 67, at 596-97. See generally Seneca & Haight, The Concept of Power: Antitrust as an
Illustration, 23 ANTITRUST BULL. 339, 339-53 (1978). In contrast, it has been argued that
conglomerate mergers are justified since large firms are able to compete more effectively in
international trade. See Note, supra note 67, at 600.
In the context of the antitrust laws, such extensive conglomeration is symptomatic of a
trend toward monopolization. See Turner, supra note 62, at 1323-30. Although section 7 of
the Clayton Act proscribes any merger that tends to create a monopoly, courts have not
construed conglomerate mergers as violative of section 7 when prosecution is based solely
upon a trend to aggregate concentration. See, e.g., United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc.,
301 F. Supp. 1066, 1096 (N.D. Ill. 1969); United States v. ITT, 306 F. Supp. 766, 796 (D.
Conn. 1969), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971). Moreover, opposition to conglomerate
mergers is often difficult. This is due in part to the inapplicability of horizontal and vertical
merger rules to the conglomerate merger situation, see Vanderstar, supra note 67, at 596,
and residually, to the courts' reluctance in recent years to avail themselves of the anticompetitive theories proposed by the FTC, Standridge & Santopietro, supra note 68, at 614 &
n.29.
70

See supra note 10.
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volving conglomerate mergers will be decided before the anticompetitive effects have manifested themselves as contravening the
preventive antitrust laws. The hold separate order, therefore, can
provide effective protection for the marketplace by furnishing a viable method of preserving the status quo until a complete resolution of the issues can be accomplished. 7 '
CONCLUSION

By refusing to issue a full-stop preliminary injunction despite
a showing of a likelihood of success on the merits, it is submitted
that the District of Columbia Circuit has sharply curtailed the enforcement role created for the FTC in section 13(b). In addition,
the court's endorsement of the less than stringent relief provided
by hold separate orders in the horizontal merger context appears
to undermine the precautionary policies embodied in section 7 of
the Clayton Act. Unfortunately, the Weyerhaeuser decision may
serve to encourage acquisition-minded entities to structure their
transactions in a manner contrary to the purposes of section 7, section 13(b), and other statutes designed to further a competitive
marketplace. At the very least, this decision substantially will impair the FTC's efforts to eliminate anticompetitive behavior in its
incipiency and to protect the public's interest in maintaining a
procompetitive economy.
Kevin J. Lyons
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See generally 3 J.

VON KALINOWSKI,

supra note 59, § 15.02[1][a]; supra note 10.

